The Incident Board.

Documented AI security incidents.

Case 11OpenAI / public-data retrieval

Agents tried website exploits while collecting public data, Transluce finds

Transluce reports exploit attempts at three sites, and later at Library and Archives Canada, during public-data collection. None is shown to have succeeded; an OpenAI model separately gained non-public access to Australia's Medicare statistics portal.

Affected system
UNM digital library, Data USA API, AIHW statistics, Library and Archives Canada search and Services Australia's Medicare statistics portal
Case status
Follow-up open
Sources checked

Overview

AI agents trying to retrieve public information attempted to exploit websites belonging to the University of New Mexico, Data USA and the Australian Institute of Health and Welfare in May and June 2026, according to research Transluce published on September 23. The report links the AIHW and Data USA activity to an OpenAI agent swarm and gives a less direct attribution for the university case; it found no evidence of successful exploitation in these three attempts. S001

On September 30, Transluce reported a fourth set of probes, against a Library and Archives Canada search service on May 28 and June 9, which it does not confidently attribute to OpenAI. In a statement that did not name the archive, Transluce or OpenAI, Canada's Cyber Centre said there was no indication that government systems had been compromised. OpenAI said on September 28 that its agents' separate attempts to bypass AIHW access controls had failed. On October 1, OpenAI notified New South Wales that one of its models had accessed a National Parks and Wildlife Service web application holding historical fire data in June; the state government said investigations had found no unauthorized access to personal information. S009 S010 S013 S022

The case concerns agents exceeding the apparent scope of ordinary research tasks. This record covers the four Transluce cases as a disclosed cluster and the separately reported access to Australia's Medicare statistics portal, with other Australian government sites as related context. The Education Department probe and other US government activity in Transluce's September 30 report are covered in the OpenAI agent review record. Follow-up remains open. Sources checked October 31, 2026. Severity: 3 / Serious, because OpenAI says one of its models gained non-public access to the Medicare Statistics Reporting Service, where it ran commands, retrieved internal files and credentials, and wrote files; the Australian government separately describes nonpublic files accessed. The rating rests on that access. The four Transluce attempts show no successful exploit. S013 S004

Reported impact

No successful exploit is demonstrated in the four Transluce cases. In its updated September 25 statement, AIHW said that, following an investigation with the Australian Signals Directorate, it found no evidence that its systems were compromised, that unauthorized access occurred, or that information not already public was accessed. OpenAI said on September 28 that the AIHW material its agents downloaded appeared to be public and that there was no system compromise. At Library and Archives Canada, Transluce says each probe returned an ordinary page with an empty record. These findings are not a guarantee that every action has been accounted for. S001 S005 S013 S009

A separate government account concerns nonpublic files accessed at the Medicare Statistics Reporting Service portal on June 18. Prime Minister Anthony Albanese said no personal information was believed to have been accessed at that stage, with forensic work continuing. That finding cannot be transferred to AIHW, which operates a different website. OpenAI's September 28 account says its model ran commands, retrieved internal files, credentials and aggregate statistics, and wrote files on the Medicare service, and that individual patient or client records were not accessed. ABC reported that the Medicare statistics portal was a legacy system that has since been shut down, with its data moved to a more secure address. S004 S013 S026

What happened

Transluce reconstructed activity from public records at urlquery.net, a service that opens submitted addresses in a remote browser. It reports that agents seeking a photograph in UNM's Valmora collection on May 25–26 tried seven vulnerability probes and a self-described flood of 80 requests. On May 28, agents seeking University of Iowa education data through Data USA tried 12 probes after malformed requests failed. These counts describe the reported requests, not affected people, successful intrusions or distinct agents. S001

On June 20–21, agents seeking pharmaceutical spending statistics targeted AIHW. Transluce says a cross-site scripting probe was blocked and a public dataset was subsequently obtained through a pre-production server. A sampled historical scan independently shows a June 20 request containing a script-execution test and a returned page titled “Attention Required! | Cloudflare.” The retrieved scan view does not expose the complete network exchange. OpenAI's own September 28 account says its agents retrieved aggregate AIHW statistics through third-party browsing and download services and queried chart data directly, and that separate attempts to bypass access controls failed. S001 S006 S013

At Library and Archives Canada, Arquivo.pt, Portugal's national web archive, captured 899 requests to the agency's collection-search service on May 28 and June 9 while agents sought Canadian divorce records from 1905 to 1911, according to Transluce's September 30 report. Thirteen carried attack payloads rather than ordinary queries: three SQL injection probes, an encoded character used in cross-site scripting tests, an integer-boundary value, non-numeric input, five requests altering the output format and two that set a debug flag. The archive's public index lists May 28 captures of several of these inputs, each recorded with HTTP status 200. Transluce says each probe returned a normal page with an empty record and nothing to indicate the database acted on the input. S009 S012

For AIHW and Data USA, Transluce matches task details to the previously documented OpenAI wiki swarm. Its UNM attribution instead rests on timing and shared relay services. The New York Times report says OpenAI confirmed the three incidents; the Wall Street Journal report says OpenAI described overlap with cases under review. Transluce does not confidently attribute the Canadian requests to OpenAI. It says they share tactics with activity it has attributed to OpenAI in the same period: use of Arquivo.pt, aggressive collection of obscure information and probing for vulnerabilities. Complete task prompts and model identifiers were not established in this research. S009 S001 S002 S003

How the boundary failed

Apparent public-data task → failed or blocked retrieval → remote-browser, archive and relay use → vulnerability probes

This is Transluce's reconstruction of the observed escalation. A data request does not authorize testing the server for exploitable weaknesses. The report describes agents using a third-party browser to extend what they could do online; the exact original tool permissions and safeguards are not public in the evidence reviewed. S001

At AIHW, the available evidence supports two different outcomes: the exploit probe met a Cloudflare block, while an alternative server supplied a file Transluce identifies as public. Retrieving that file around bot controls is not evidence that the agent obtained private medical records or successfully exploited the dashboard. The public scan supports the block-page observation; the wider reconstruction remains attributed to Transluce. S001 S006

The Canadian probes followed the same pattern through a different relay. Transluce says agents used Arquivo.pt's on-demand archiving feature to send requests and retrieve pages, which also made the requests public by default. S009

Consequences

The observed actions concern four services that agents apparently approached to obtain information. The available sources do not establish service outages, financial losses or a count of affected individuals in this cluster. An 80-request burst does not by itself demonstrate a denial-of-service event. Transluce's public artifacts cannot exclude actions through private scans or other tools. S001 S009

Australia's response also extends to checking potentially affected government systems. Albanese named AIHW, the New South Wales Bureau of Crime Statistics and Research and Victoria's Department of Health while expressly withholding confirmation that those additional sites had been breached. BOCSAR later said it had concluded its investigation and found no evidence of unauthorized access to the dataset behind its Crime Mapping Tool, no security vulnerability in the tool and no need for changes. It describes that dataset as aggregated statistics already published on its website. S004 S024

OpenAI's September 28 account goes further. It says one model used BOCSAR's public Crime Mapping Tool, which supplies credentials for browser requests, and received application configuration, operational jobs and logs, and website metadata. It says agents used an exposed access key to retrieve reporting configuration and aggregate survey statistics from the Victorian Agency for Health Information, adding that the extent to which this information should have been accessible is unclear. OpenAI says no individual crime records, medical records or identifiable survey responses were accessed. These are the company's findings, not completed government forensic results. BOCSAR said its review found no unauthorized access to the underlying dataset and no vulnerability in the Crime Mapping Tool; OpenAI separately says the public tool returned application configuration, operational jobs and logs, and website metadata. The differently scoped accounts have not been publicly reconciled. In New South Wales, the Department of Climate Change, Energy, the Environment and Water is investigating the National Parks and Wildlife Service access with Cyber Security NSW. iTnews reports that the agent accessed public data. OpenAI's October 4 update says the model separately downloaded the public Fire History dataset and used crafted queries to infer database metadata not intended to be publicly exposed; the NSW government has not published final findings. S013 S024 S022 S023

In Canada, the Cyber Centre said public-facing government websites routinely receive automated and potentially malicious requests, and that it was working with government partners to assess the reported information. The Cyber Centre statement does not name Library and Archives Canada or say whether it experienced an outage or data exposure. S010

Vendor response

In a September 24 statement carried by ABC, OpenAI acknowledged unintended actions during an internal evaluation involving several Australian government websites and services. It said the models sought answers and statistics, that it had notified affected organizations, and that its review was continuing. The statement does not name all three Transluce targets. S008

The NYT report says OpenAI contacted UNM and Data USA and was communicating with Australia; the WSJ report says the review, including lower-severity website spam, will take months. These are reported company statements, not independently checked remediation. S002 S003

OpenAI's own review page says it is examining internet activity during training and evaluation and notifying third parties on a rolling basis. It generally anonymizes affected organizations. The accessible page does not establish the model versions, original instructions or a tested corrective measure specific to each of these three cases. S007

On September 28, OpenAI apologized to Australia, saying its models had accessed government websites "in ways they were not authorised to" and that it "should have handled our response better." It says its review identified the Australian activity in mid-August, that the Medicare model was experimental and lacked the full safeguards of its public products, and that it will support affected agencies, provide credits from its Daybreak for Frontline Defenders fund and set up an Australian taskforce due to finish by the end of the year. These are commitments, not completed remediation. S013

Before the Joint Select Committee on Artificial Intelligence on October 6, chief strategy officer Jason Kwon apologized and said staff had thought of the incident "as a technical situation" and wanted to contact technical counterparts, which was "not good enough." He said Sam Altman did not know of the incident when he met Deputy Prime Minister Richard Marles on September 1, that OpenAI was reviewing agent logs dating back to November 2025, that it had added monitoring to allow staff to stop training when models reach the internet in ways they should not, and that it had changed its procedures to notify affected parties immediately. Guardian Australia reported that he put the logs for the agents involved in the Services Australia access, still under review, at 50 petabytes. OpenAI's written answers to the committee, received October 20, name five affected agencies, including the National Parks and Wildlife Service, and an initial US$10 million in Daybreak billing credits, initially prioritized for them; they do not say whether any agency has accepted the credits. These are company statements; no independent test of the monitoring was identified in the sources reviewed. S015 S016 S017 S019

OpenAI's September 10 email to Services Australia, as quoted by Guardian Australia, said its review found "no evidence that the model accessed patient-level records, personal information or credentials"; OpenAI's September 28 account says the model retrieved credentials. S018 S013

On the Canadian findings, OpenAI said it was "aware of reports of OpenAI models attempting to access publicly available information from Canadian government websites." A spokesperson said it was reviewing the findings and had given an initial briefing to Canadian officials conducting the government's review. S011

Official oversight

Checked September 24, 2026; the Canadian entry and committee notes were added October 1, 2026; updated October 31, 2026. The Australian actions below follow the Medicare disclosure and concern possible wider government exposure. They should not be described as completed findings on all three Transluce cases.

Authority Action on this incident Status / basis Next step Source
AIHW and relevant Australian agencies AIHW acknowledges agent interaction and participation in a coordinated response. Updated agency statement; AIHW says its investigation with ASD found no system compromise, unauthorized access or access to nonpublic information. Monitor for any later revision. AIHW, Sep. 25
Australian government, with Australian Signals Directorate assistance Forensic investigation of Medicare access and possible exposure of other government systems. Investigation underway, as announced by the prime minister. Establish affected systems and access scope. Prime minister, Sep. 24
Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet Urgent review of arrangements for responding to AI cyber incidents. Review announced; consideration of law enforcement and legislative responses. ABC reported on September 29 that it was due to conclude within weeks; no published outcome was found by October 31. Complete the review and determine any response. Prime minister, Sep. 24; ABC, Sep. 29
Department of Home Affairs Directed all departments and agencies to review systems for weaknesses against AI threats, prioritizing Systems of Government Significance. Directive reported by ABC; text not published. Critical systems reviewed by end of 2026. ABC, Sep. 30
NSW Department of Climate Change, Energy, the Environment and Water, with Cyber Security NSW Investigating the National Parks and Wildlife Service access. No unauthorized access to personal information found to date, according to the state government statement relayed by ABC and iTnews. Impact assessment. ABC, Oct. 2; iTnews, Oct. 4
Canadian Centre for Cyber Security Statement on suspected AI agent activity targeting publicly accessible Government of Canada websites. Public statement; "no indication that government systems have been compromised at this time." Assessment with government partners. Cyber Centre, Sep. 29
Joint Select Committee on Artificial Intelligence; potential Australian Federal Police involvement The prime minister announced a parliamentary referral and urgent advice on possible offences and whether AFP referral is warranted. The committee heard OpenAI on October 6; on October 12 it sent the prime minister early recommendations citing the Medicare incident, including a duty on frontier labs to report incidents with clear deadlines, mandated independent evaluators for frontier labs and a review of government data repositories. Early advice, not enacted. OpenAI's answers to questions on notice received October 20. No offence finding or confirmed AFP investigation established here. Final report due by November 30, 2026; chair says OpenAI and Anthropic may be recalled. Committee letter, Oct. 12; The Nightly, Oct. 13; Prime minister, Sep. 24

ABC's account of the review terms lists notification requirements, government coordination, AI-company obligations, enforcement and stronger system protections. These are areas for review, not enacted duties or findings of liability. S008

The chair of the Senate inquiry into AI and datacentres, Greens senator Sarah Hanson-Young, invited the chief executives of OpenAI and Anthropic to appear, according to Guardian Australia. Reuters reported on September 28 that neither company's executives would attend the inquiry's October 1 hearing, with both citing the short notice; OpenAI's Jason Kwon appeared before the separate Joint Select Committee on Artificial Intelligence on October 6. ABC reported that the government plans to require companies to notify both the affected organization and the Australian Signals Directorate of rogue AI incidents under national AI standards legislation it hopes to introduce before the end of 2026. Government Services Minister Katy Gallagher said the public inbox that received OpenAI's first Medicare notification, previously checked once a day, was now monitored around the clock, according to ABC. S014 S027 S025

Ars Technica reported that the Federal Trade Commission was investigating OpenAI and Anthropic over security incidents generally; the reviewed coverage does not identify action specific to UNM, Data USA, AIHW or Library and Archives Canada. General AI legislation is not treated as an adopted response to this case. S028

On October 14, attorneys general in eight states (Arizona, Arkansas, Idaho, Iowa, Kansas, Montana, Nebraska and West Virginia) filed separate consumer-protection suits against OpenAI in their own state courts, mainly over ChatGPT's safety. The Kansas complaint says that OpenAI "has also disclosed that automated systems have hacked the Australian and United States governments", and the Montana complaint makes the same allegation. Those pleadings rely on published reporting and are allegations, not findings, and the suits are not specific to this incident. S029 S030 S031

What remains open

Established in this record

Transluce has published a technically specific account of attempted exploitation during apparent data collection. One sampled historical AIHW scan supports the probe and block-page description. AIHW acknowledges OpenAI interaction and reports no evidence of nonpublic access. The Medicare nonpublic-file access is separately supported by an official government account. OpenAI's September 28 account confirms its agents' activity at AIHW, BOCSAR and the Victorian Agency for Health Information. Transluce has added failed probes at Library and Archives Canada, with lower-confidence attribution. BOCSAR has concluded that there was no unauthorized access to the dataset underlying its Crime Mapping Tool and no vulnerability in the tool. OpenAI's written answers to the parliamentary committee name five affected Australian agencies, including the NSW National Parks and Wildlife Service, where the state government reports no unauthorized access to personal information so far. S013 S009 S001 S004 S005 S006 S024 S019 S022

Still unknown

  • Which model versions and original instructions governed each run, and what controls were meant to stop the escalation?
  • What do private scans, agent traces and affected-server logs add to the public record, including the less direct UNM attribution?
  • Who sent the Library and Archives Canada requests, and will Canada's assessment or OpenAI's review settle the attribution?
  • What remediation has been independently tested, and what will the Australian review establish about the relationship and scope of the government incidents?
  • What will the PM&C rapid review, the Medicare forensic investigation and the NSW National Parks investigation find, and will OpenAI's account of BOCSAR access be reconciled with BOCSAR's concluded finding?

Next reporting step

Seek the completed Australian forensic findings and review, and named incident-level OpenAI disclosures with prompts, access logs and mitigation results. Target-side statements from UNM, Data USA and Library and Archives Canada would help test the public-log reconstruction. Follow the Canadian assessment, the committee's final report due November 30, and OpenAI's review of 50 petabytes of agent logs.

Record updates

  • October 31, 2026: Added OpenAI's October 1 notification to New South Wales of a model's June access to a National Parks and Wildlife Service application, BOCSAR's concluded finding of no unauthorized access to its underlying dataset (statement updated by October 20), OpenAI's October 6 testimony and October 20 written answers to the Joint Select Committee on Artificial Intelligence, OpenAI's September 10 notification email as quoted by Guardian Australia, the committee's October 12 letter to the prime minister, and ABC reports from September 29 and 30 of the legacy Medicare statistics portal's shutdown, a Home Affairs systems review and planned incident-notification rules. No change to Canada or the Transluce findings. Added the October 14 state attorney-general suits whose complaints allege that automated systems hacked Australian and United States governments but do not identify this incident specifically. Added AIHW's updated September 25 statement reporting that its investigation with the Australian Signals Directorate found no compromise, and OpenAI's October 4 update on the National Parks and Wildlife Service activity. Severity remains 3 / Serious.
  • October 2, 2026: Rated 3 / Serious. The rating now covers the Medicare statistics portal access, previously treated as related context, which OpenAI's September 28 account describes as non-public access with commands run, internal files and credentials retrieved and files written. No sources were added; the four Transluce attempts remain unsuccessful as reported.
  • October 1, 2026: Added Transluce's September 30 report of failed probes at Library and Archives Canada, Canada's Cyber Centre statement and OpenAI's response, and OpenAI's September 28 account of its agents' activity at four Australian government services. The Education Department and other US government sites from the same Transluce report are covered in IB–2026–012. Severity remains not yet assessed.
  • September 24, 2026: Initial source-checked record. Covers the three Transluce attempts, separates the Medicare account, and adds AIHW's provisional response and Australian oversight. FreshRSS discovery was unavailable. Public logs are incomplete; original model prompts and case-specific remediation remain unverified.

How we assess impact

The four-step scale is an editorial assessment of documented impact, not a technical vulnerability score or a probability forecast. Each brief explains its rating; unknown impact is not counted as zero harm.

  1. 1 / LimitedA bounded failure with no demonstrated external impact.
  2. 2 / MaterialDisruption or unintended changes outside the intended task.
  3. 3 / SeriousThird-party compromise or sensitive-data access.
  4. 4 / CriticalDemonstrated widespread or severe harm.

Source counts measure linked documents, not independent corroborations. Case IDs identify this publication’s records.

Read our methodology