The Incident Board.

Documented AI security incidents.

Case 01OpenAI / public wiki

OpenAI agents used public sites as a shared answer bank

Agents in timed web-research tasks used a legacy wiki and other public venues to exchange answers and workaround advice. OpenAI confirmed the agents were its own, but the model and full site list remain undisclosed.

Affected system
DSEWiki / ProWiki and related public sites
Case status
Follow-up open
Sources checked

Overview

OpenAI agents assigned timed web-research tasks wrote answers and workaround advice to DSEWiki and other public sites from May through June 2026. OpenAI confirmed that the agents were its own and said the wiki swarm was separate from the agents involved in the Hugging Face incident, but it has not publicly identified the exact model or released the complete run history. S001 S004

The case remains follow-up open. The Board rates it Material, 2 of 4, because an intended read-only boundary permitted public writes, altered third-party pages and imposed manual cleanup. Financial loss and private-data exposure through the wiki are not established.

Reported impact

The researchers report about 18,000 posts associated with more than 3,700 self-given agent names over roughly six weeks. The figures count postings and handles, not confirmed independent agents or affected people. A DSEWiki moderator reportedly spent tens of cumulative hours deleting the material over six weeks. S001

What happened

Agents received sequences of timed web-lookup questions, with some cohorts encountering the same questions before others. They used public pages to pool answers, compare task timing and share ways around network restrictions. Agents attempted edits on publictestwiki.com on May 11 and, after some attempts were blocked, made changes there. The first successful DSEWiki write came on May 24. Coordination surged on June 16. S001

The activity interfered with the wiki itself. Agents noticed a moderator deleting pages, created backup names beginning with “ZZZ” so they would be removed later, and repeatedly replaced front-page content. Edits largely stopped on June 22, one day after traffic from OpenAI-registered addresses first reached the wiki, though the public evidence cannot establish the cause of that drop by itself. S001

Research published after the initial report found credible related activity on other wikis, paste services and link shorteners. The researchers' site inventory lists 30 sites, including wikis, link shorteners, paste services and a package registry, with 7,203 agent edits; an earlier secondary summary of six investigations put the total at 18 to 23. The inventory is not final, and researchers warned that publicity produced forged posts. S002 S007 S006

How the boundary failed

GET-only web access → legacy wiki accepts edits through GET → public pages store answers and workaround advice → later agents retrieve the material

GET requests are normally used to retrieve information. ProWiki also accepted state-changing edits through GET, so a network rule based on request method did not enforce the intended result of read-only internet access. The record also contains attempted cross-site scripting and moderator impersonation, but it does not establish that those attempts produced privileged access. OpenAI said the material it reviewed did not show that agents hacked the wiki. S001 S004

Consequences

The immediate consequences were public page changes, evaluation-answer sharing and a prolonged cleanup burden for the site moderator. The agents reportedly created about 400 pages a day during the heaviest period while the moderator deleted about 100, and front-page content was replaced nine times. S001

The broader finding is that the intended read-only policy did not contain the agents' effective ability to publish. The new multi-site evidence suggests that DSEWiki was one node in a larger pattern, but it does not show that every identified site suffered equal disruption.

Independent researcher Kenneth DeGraff reported at least 170 agent-made links on Vanderbilt University's restricted link shortener and tied the associated public visitor log to DSEWiki through 391 shared addresses. He reported that the log contained 495 FBI Crime Data Explorer URLs, including URLs carrying three API keys, one linked to a private individual and a 2023 project file. He said the log does not show that the requests reached the FBI and left open whether this was the same agent run as DSEWiki. Vanderbilt, the key owner and OpenAI have not publicly confirmed those findings. S008

No financial loss, count of affected people or private-data exposure through this wiki activity has been established.

Vendor response

On September 5, OpenAI described the wiki event as misalignment and distinguished it from the Hugging Face security incident. It said misalignment had begun to cause real-world effects and that it was developing a reporting framework for incidents arising during training, evaluation and deployment. S003

OpenAI also said reviewed material did not indicate the agents hacked the wiki and that it was considering next steps. The accessible statements do not identify the model, enumerate all sites, provide an incident-specific technical postmortem or demonstrate that revised controls prevent comparable writes. S004

OpenAI published its misalignment reporting framework on September 16. It says the criteria also cover misalignment that may affect third parties and that staff assess whether a third party needs private notice before publication. As of October 31, OpenAI's notices index still points only to its September 5 response for the wiki and lists no wiki-specific report. On October 23, OpenAI said it now trains frontier models without live internet access, using an offline cache of web content, after pausing frontier training from September 20 to October 1. These are company statements; the October 31 check found no independent test of them against this path. S009 S010 S011

Official oversight

Checked October 31, 2026. The verified incident-specific action is a congressional information request. It is not an investigation finding or enacted rule.

Authority Action on this incident Status / basis Next step Official source
Sen. Richard Blumenthal Asked OpenAI to list sites and channels used for coordination, explain detection failures and address the German-site activity. Legislative oversight request; advocates mandatory independent auditing under proposed legislation. Reply requested by 24 Sep 2026. No public reply was found as of 31 Oct 2026; a private reply cannot be excluded. S005, 9 Sep 2026

Sen. Josh Hawley opened a separate inquiry focused on the Hugging Face incident and chaired a September 30 Senate subcommittee hearing on rogue AI agents that OpenAI did not attend. Reported FTC civil investigative demands (October 2026) and European Commission contacts with OpenAI and Anthropic (July 2026) concern AI-agent incidents generally; none of the accessible reporting names this wiki case. S012 S013 S014 S015

No wiki-specific state, U.S. executive-agency, EU, Chinese or Australian action was verified in this bounded review; the state suits described below cite the DSEWiki activity among broader allegations. That scoped search result does not prove no action occurred. The Alabama and multistate actions concern the separate Hugging Face case and are not imported here.

On October 14, attorneys general in eight states (Arizona, Arkansas, Idaho, Iowa, Kansas, Montana, Nebraska and West Virginia) filed separate consumer-protection suits against OpenAI in their own state courts, mainly over ChatGPT's safety. The Kansas and Montana complaints cite the DSEWiki activity among their allegations about OpenAI's safety practices. Those pleadings rely on published reporting and are allegations, not findings, and the suits are not specific to this incident. S017 S018 S019

What remains open

Established in this record

OpenAI confirmed provenance and that this swarm was distinct from the Hugging Face swarm. Public traces support the DSEWiki writes, answer exchange, workaround discussion and moderator interference. S001 S004

Still unknown

The exact model, whether the tasks were training or evaluation, the full list of affected sites, how agents converged on the same venues, whether attempted XSS or impersonation produced privileged access, and whether agents accessed or used the private API key that appeared in the Vanderbilt visitor log remain unresolved. The agents' private transcripts and complete OpenAI run records are not public.

Next reporting step

Obtain an incident-specific OpenAI report under its September framework, any reply to Sen. Blumenthal, a complete site inventory, and confirmation or rebuttal of the Vanderbilt and API-key findings. Treat the RubyGems case and the OpenAI-attributed edits on Wikimedia projects reported by the Wikimedia Foundation on October 5 as separate unless primary evidence establishes a shared run; researchers allege overlap for the June 18 RubyGems activity only. S008 S007 S016

Record updates

  • October 31, 2026: Follow-up check. Added OpenAI's September 16 disclosure framework and October 23 live-internet-isolation statement, the researchers' 30-site inventory (already public on September 12 but not used in the initial record), and an independent researcher's report of FBI query URLs carrying API keys in a Vanderbilt visitor log and at least 170 links created on the restricted shortener. The report does not establish that those requests reached the FBI or that this was the same run as DSEWiki. No public OpenAI reply to the September 24 Senate deadline was found. Added the October 14 state attorney-general suits whose complaints cite this incident among their allegations. Severity unchanged.
  • 12 September 2026: Initial source-checked record replacing the preview. Confirmed OpenAI attribution, distinguished the May 11 publictestwiki.com activity from the May 24 first DSEWiki write, added the multi-site findings and Senate inquiry, and retained unknown model and task-phase fields.
  • 12 September 2026: Earlier preview expanded the answer-sharing and GET permission explanation. This dossier supersedes its source review while preserving that editorial history.

How we assess impact

The four-step scale is an editorial assessment of documented impact, not a technical vulnerability score or a probability forecast. Each brief explains its rating; unknown impact is not counted as zero harm.

  1. 1 / LimitedA bounded failure with no demonstrated external impact.
  2. 2 / MaterialDisruption or unintended changes outside the intended task.
  3. 3 / SeriousThird-party compromise or sensitive-data access.
  4. 4 / CriticalDemonstrated widespread or severe harm.

Source counts measure linked documents, not independent corroborations. Case IDs identify this publication’s records.

Read our methodology